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Practice and Precedent in Historical Gloss Games 
JOSEPH BLOCHER* AND MARGARET H. LEMOS** 
Historical practices can help define the separation of powers. One 
branch’s claim of authority and another branch’s acquiescence can put a 
“gloss” on the sparse text of Articles I–III, especially when repeated over 
time. For example, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer—the opinion that coined the term “gloss”—turned on 
whether Congress had acquiesced in the President’s asserted practice of 
seizing private property during the course of armed conflict.1 
In these “gloss games” there are always at least two players: the 
branch that is claiming authority and the branch that is ceding it. Most 
prior scholarship in this area focuses on contests between the legislative 
and executive branches.2 Officials in these branches can assert authority in 
various ways and when the same actions are repeated over time, they may 
coalesce into a form of historical practice. Members of Congress can issue 
statements, propose new laws, create and structure agencies, confirm 
nominees for federal office, vote for or against legislation, and so on.  The 
President can make appointments, issue executive orders, veto legislation, 
direct troops, and the like. These actions are not compelled by other 
sources of law and may vary significantly from one actor (or set of actors) 
to the next. The potential for variation is what gives weight to practices 
that are “systematic, unbroken,” and unchallenged by the competing 
branch.3 
In Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial 
Separation of Powers, Professors Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel challenge 
scholars to consider how historical practice might illuminate a different set 
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1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring) (“It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law 
to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has 
written upon them.”); see also id. at 610–11 (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive 
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, 
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it 
were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a 
gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”). 
2. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, 
Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2015); 
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012). 
3. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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of constitutional questions: those concerning Article III.4  Their principal 
goal is to unveil a set of argumentative methodologies based in historical 
practice; 5  they do so by revisiting and recasting historical episodes 
involving “Court-packing” and “Court-stripping” (that is, restricting the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court based on substantive 
disagreement on matters of law).6 Bradley and Siegel’s article suggests a 
new avenue of inquiry for federal courts scholarship, and they demonstrate 
convincingly that gloss and convention-based arguments—typically 
deployed in disputes about the boundaries between Articles I and II—can 
also shed light on questions about Article III.7  
There is something striking about Bradley and Siegel’s historical 
examples, however: they feature two-branch games over what are 
arguably three-branch questions of authority. Although courts were the 
central subjects of the disputes over Court-packing and Court-stripping, 
courts were not really engaged in those disputes—at least not in ways that 
involved the kinds of “practices” that animate conventional gloss-based 
analysis. Participants in the debates made claims based on historical 
practice, to be sure, but they were not talking about the conduct of courts 
or judges. Instead, they were referring to legislative or executive practices.  
In this response, we try to explain why courts were on the sidelines of 
these gloss games and why other disputes over Article III are likely to 
reflect a similar structure. The key, we think, lies in a distinctive feature of 
judicial decision making: the doctrine of stare decisis. Although judicial 
conduct may take various forms, the heart of the judicial function is 
deciding cases. Those decisions are subject to a system of precedent that 
gives them binding force and commands obedience by other judges. And 
adherence to precedent is importantly distinct from the types of legislative 
or executive practices that courts and commentators have treated as 
constitutionally salient. The point of stare decisis is to ensure that 
decisions in Case 2 and beyond are consistent with the decision in Case 1. 
Precedent therefore limits the potential for variance in judicial practice 
                                                
4. Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, 
and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255 (2016).  
5. Id. at 260. 
6. See id. at 269, 287. 
7. Bradley and Siegel distinguish between gloss and conventions, both of which may 
rest on historical practice. We focus here on gloss, though much of what we have to say 
would apply as well to arguments based on conventions—at least to the extent that such 
arguments turn on a pattern of power grabs and acquiescence repeated over time. For 
more on conventions, see Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1181–94 (2013). 
2016] THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE 3 
 
 3 
and, in so doing, limits the reach of a practice-based approach to judicial 
separation-of-powers disputes.8   
 
I.  THREE KINDS OF GLOSS GAMES INVOLVING THE COURTS  
The threshold challenge in thinking about historical practices and the 
courts is to identify the various roles courts might play in gloss games. At 
least three different roles seem possible. First, courts might act as referees 
in gloss games between the political branches. Second, courts might be the 
subjects of disputes between Congress and the President concerning the 
judiciary.  Finally—and most importantly for our purposes—courts might 
be players in gloss games with another branch (or branches) regarding the 
judicial power.  
A. COURTS AS REFEREES 
Many disputes between Congress and the President never reach the 
courts. Sometimes, however, courts act as referees between the political 
branches. In such cases, courts might use the historical practices of the 
political branches to illuminate the boundaries between Articles I and II. 
Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Youngstown is an example,9  as is the 
Court’s more recent decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning.10   
These cases represent the standard story of a gloss game. In these 
instances, the legislative and executive branches create the relevant gloss 
in their interactions with one another, and the courts—if and when 
presented with a case—rely on those interactions in resolving it. Although 
courts assume a role in such disputes, they are not players in the relevant 
gloss game. 
                                                
8. Following Bradley and Siegel, we focus on a particular theory about why practice 
matters. As noted in the text above, the theory of “historical gloss” credits practice 
because it tells us something about how actors in different branches conceive of their 
power and how they have resolved border disputes over the years. On that view, practices 
that are repeated over time have special force because they represent the accumulated 
judgment of a series of independent decision makers. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 4, 
at 261–65. It is of course possible to imagine different reasons why longstanding practice 
might matter. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive 
and Entrenchment Effects of Historical Practice in Federal Courts Law, 58 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 535, 536 (2016) (offering a Burkean approach to historical practice under 
which “past practice derives authority from its sheer pastness”). The features that 
distinguish adherence to precedent from gloss-style “practice” may have less significance 
for theories that do not turn on repetition and acquiescence.   
9 . Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
10. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (acknowledging the 
weight of prior practice); see also Bradley & Siegel, supra note 2 (describing the Noel 
Canning Court’s invocation of historical practice to uphold the President’s power to 
make recess appointments). 
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B. COURTS AS SUBJECTS  
In a second set of cases, the political branches are involved in a dispute 
about the courts. Debates over Court-packing exemplify this kind of 
dispute. When the political branches fight over the courts, the practices of 
those branches might be relevant in resolving disputes between them. For 
example, Congress might attempt to hold a current President to his 
predecessor’s practice of not attempting to pack the Supreme Court. Or, 
conversely, the President might argue that Congress has acquiesced 
repeatedly to changes to the Court’s composition. In either direction, the 
argument is that one branch has validly ceded territory to the other.  
As Bradley and Siegel show, this is precisely what happened when 
FDR proposed to pack the Court in 1937. Historical practices were 
regularly invoked throughout the debates over FDR’s plan and were 
treated by many as having something like constitutional status. 11  The 
results of the game had important consequences for the courts,12 but the 
practices in question were generally those of the political branches—not 
the courts themselves.  
C. COURTS AS PLAYERS 
There is a third category of gloss game involving the federal judicial 
power—one in which the courts are active players. Here, the courts are 
directly involved in a conflict with another branch over the scope of the 
federal judicial power. These cases differ from the first two categories 
precisely because they involve the courts as participants in the gloss game. 
In this category, courts’ own practices become part of the gloss-based 
analysis, supplying evidence that courts have consistently asserted (or 
assumed) a certain power or that they have consistently acquiesced in 
power grabs by the other branches. 
Disputes about the scope of judicial review or Court-stripping would 
seem to be natural candidates for this category because they might pit the 
judiciary against the political branches. Indeed, Bradley and Siegel’s 
second major historical example involves various debates about the scope 
of Congress’s authority to engage in Court-stripping. These debates are 
illuminating in their own right, and Bradley and Siegel have further 
enriched them by uncovering and describing a 1980s debate between John 
Roberts, then a Justice Department lawyer, and Theodore Olson, then head 
of the Office of Legal Counsel, regarding congressional authority to strip 
                                                
11. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 4, at 274–75.  
12. See Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the 
Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 
153, 157 (2003) (“To understand judicial independence and its limits, then, we must look 
beyond ‘doctrinal’ independence as divined by courts, and examine the historical 
development of ‘customary’ independence as it has emerged in Congress.”). 
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Supreme Court jurisdiction.13 Roberts, Olson, and others sought to buttress 
their arguments with claims based on historical practice. But, again, the 
practices they invoked were not those of the courts. When Roberts argued 
in favor of the constitutionality of Court-stripping, the limited weight he 
gave to historical practice focused on the actions of Congress. 14  In 
response, Olson sought to downplay the fact that the first Judiciary Act did 
not authorize the Court to exercise all of the appellate jurisdiction 
established by Article III. He emphasized that Congress later created a 
statutory regime under which the Court has broad appellate jurisdiction 
and noted that “throughout our history there have been movements to curb 
the Court’s jurisdiction which have never succeeded.”15   
This is not to say that the Court had no influence on the debates; the 
participants regularly invoked its actions. But in doing so, they focused 
(properly, we think) on the Court’s core activity—deciding cases—and the 
results of that activity—precedent. In particular, political actors on both 
sides of the debates tried to make sense of the Court’s decision in Ex parte 
McCardle, 16  which provided ambiguous authority for jurisdiction-
stripping.17 But the debaters did not treat McCardle, or any other judicial 
decision, as a form of historical judicial practice.  Instead, (and again, 
properly) they treated precedent as a conceptually distinct source of 
authority.  
II.  HOW COURTS CREATE GLOSS: PRACTICE AND PRECEDENT 
Why do we not see courts playing a more active role in gloss games 
about the judicial separation of powers? We think the answer has to do 
with stare decisis—a doctrine unique to the courts. Actions by members of 
the legislative and executive branches do not trigger formal rules of 
precedent. Tomorrow’s President is not bound (at least not as tightly as a 
judge) to interpret Article II in the same way as today’s. That decisional 
freedom is critical to the theory of historical gloss: The potential for 
variation is what makes it meaningful when different political actors 
coalesce around a shared vision of their constitutional authority. But 
actions by courts often are binding, and the consequence is to leave less 
room for the accumulation of historical practice. 
                                                
13. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 4, at 302–311.  
14. Id. at 305–06. 
15. Id. at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
16. Ex parte McCardle,74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). 
17. See, e.g., Bradley & Siegel, supra note 4, at 305 (recounting Olson’s argument 
that McCardle “is simply the most prominent in a long and consistent line of judicial 
opinions reading the exceptions clause as meaning exactly what it says.”). 
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A.  OBEDIENCE VS. AGREEMENT 
Gloss-based reasoning relies on a particular form of government 
action. The relevant actions tend to be those followed continuously over 
time not because of a strong sense of legal obligation (at least not 
initially), but because successive decision makers either agree with, or 
defer to, the decisions of their predecessors. Such practices become 
constitutionally salient in large part because they are not obligatory at any 
given moment, but rather reflect a consistent series of choices—ideally 
independent of factors like party identity 18 —made by actors within a 
branch.  
Some actions by members of the judicial branch seem to fit this mold. 
Judges can give speeches, testify before Congress, or adopt rules to govern 
the procedures of their courts. They can also follow certain conventions in 
the course of deciding cases: they can sit en banc or in panels, issue 
concurring or dissenting opinions, write dicta, follow majority rule in the 
resolution of cases, adhere to the “rule of four” in granting writs of 
certiorari, and so on. Such actions might vary over time and between 
actors, and we might assess them in much the same way as we assess 
“practice” by legislative or executive actors.   
These exercises of soft power can be quite important, especially within 
the domain of internal judicial administration. And although they seem 
unlikely to have the kind of constitutional weight in interbranch disputes 
that would bring them within the framework Bradley and Siegel describe, 
it is not out of the question that past judicial practices could be 
persuasively deployed in a dispute between the judiciary and the political 
branches over funding, staffing, facilities, confirmations, or perhaps even 
jurisdiction. Bradley and Siegel note, for example, that “[r]esponding to 
concerns expressed by the Court that it was overburdened with mandatory 
appeals,” Congress repeatedly “made ‘exceptions’ to the Court’s 
mandatory appellate jurisdiction” and gave it more control over its 
docket.19  
But the picture changes when we consider the conduct at the very core 
of the judicial power—the actual decisions in cases and controversies.20 
                                                
18. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 2, at 460 (arguing that it matters that both 
Democratic and Republican administrations have claimed the power to conduct certain 
military operations without congressional authority). 
19 . Bradley & Siegel, supra note 4, at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Tara Leigh Grove, Article III in the Political Branches, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1835, 1846 (2015)). 
20. Cf. David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 22 
(2014) (“[W]hile there may be an intriguing debate to be had about the contours of 
judicial self-help, it is likely to remain a rarefied debate so long as we limit ourselves to 
irregular or judge-initiated practices and exclude the bulk of judicial review.”). 
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When judges decide cases, they create precedent. And precedent is distinct 
from the kinds of practices that animate gloss-based reasoning.21  Stare 
decisis gives presumptive, binding power to earlier decisions based not on 
the accumulation of agreement but on the authority of the decision 
maker. 22  That authority does not depend on whether the decision in 
question is part of a “systematic [and] unbroken” practice pursued over 
time; 23  a single case on a matter of first impression can establish 
precedent. Lower courts are bound to follow the decisions of higher 
courts, regardless of any prior practice or what they might think about the 
wisdom of those decisions. 
Precisely because (and to the degree that) precedent has binding force, 
the inferences that we can draw from consistent judicial action over time 
are weaker than in the traditional gloss context. The executive and 
legislature may see a strategic advantage in following the practices of their 
forbears and perhaps some obligation to defer to them in the absence of 
strong disagreement. But the notion of precedent means that courts are 
bound more strongly to their own past actions. As a result, their 
consistency is overdetermined: It may simply be a function of obedience, 
not of agreement or endorsement. And to the extent that it is the former, it 
is not the kind of considered historical practice that matters in a gloss 
game.  
As an example, consider the converse of jurisdiction-stripping: the 
question of jurisdiction-declining, which presents the same kind of 
interbranch dispute that typically gives rise to invocations of gloss. Can a 
federal court decline to exercise jurisdiction that has been vested in it by 
                                                
21. But cf. Young, supra note 8, at 563 (noting that “[w]e generally think of judicial 
precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis as their own modality of interpretation—not 
part of a broader reliance on historical practice,” but arguing that “[t]he influence that 
past decisions have in resolving present controversies” is itself an “example of judicial 
reliance on past practice”). Professor Young takes pains to distinguish the theory of 
historical practice that he advances from the more familiar gloss analysis that Bradley 
and Siegel employ, and that is the focus here. See id. at 557 (“Burke’s notion that practice 
derives its authority from longstanding usage—that the past has authority simply because 
it is the past—runs counter to much contemporary discussion of historical practice as an 
aid to constitutional interpretation. That literature tends to ground the force of practice in 
the acquiescence of critical actors.”). 
22. Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 59 (1989) 
(“[I]f incorrectness were a sufficient condition for overruling, there would be no 
precedential constraint in statutory and constitutional cases.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The 
Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
68, 73 (1991) (supporting the “traditional view that precedents should be overruled only 
when the prior decision was wrongly decided and there is some other important 
disadvantage in respecting that precedent”). 
23 . Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
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Article III and by statute? When faced with a tedious or difficult diversity 
case, for instance, can the court simply demur?   
The answer is, “it depends.” The Court has held repeatedly that federal 
courts have the “duty . . . to decide questions of state law whenever 
necessary to the rendition of a judgment.”24  But there are exceptions to 
that rule—exceptions that form the complicated doctrines of abstention 
that federal courts scholars know and love. For our purposes, the details of 
those doctrines are not important. What matters is that they are doctrines. 
When a court today is confronted with the choice between deciding a case 
within its jurisdiction or abstaining, it has a long line of cases to guide it. 
And those cases are not just useful; they are authoritative.   
Suppose, then, that our hypothetical court decides to exercise 
jurisdiction over the case. Is that decision further evidence in favor of the 
view “that federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that 
is conferred upon them by Congress”?25 Is it, in other words, an act of 
acquiescence—a relevant practice for gloss analysis? Not really. It is an 
act of obedience—not to Congress, but to precedent.  
We do not mean to overstate the binding nature of precedent nor to 
minimize its malleability. There are many ways for courts to evade, 
narrow, distinguish, and sometimes even overrule precedent. But even a 
strongly skeptical view of precedent must concede that courts are more 
tightly bound to their predecessors than presidents or legislators are to 
theirs. At the very least, the doctrine of stare decisis changes the 
conversation from one about historical practice and acquiescence to one 
about the rule of law and fidelity to precedent.  
B. STARE DECISIS: PRACTICE IN THE SHADOW OF PRECEDENT 
After precedent has been established, practices of various kinds may 
still be relevant going forward. Judges can continue to give speeches, 
write books, or testify before Congress on matters of interest, including 
matters that are governed by precedent. And although judges are obligated 
to follow precedent, they are free to criticize it, either in dissent or as they 
grudgingly go along. Thus, decisions in the wake of precedent may not 
reflect obedience and nothing else—there is often room left for 
independent decision making. If these actions are sufficiently widespread 
and continuous, they could constitute a species of historical judicial 
practice.  
In what way might such post-precedent practices matter? First, they 
might affect the future vitality of some precedent. The distinction between 
matters that are governed by precedent and those that are not will not 
                                                
24. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).   
25. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996). 
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always be clear, and judges have substantial discretion to interpret 
precedent narrowly or expansively. Judicial practices—public criticism, 
grumbling dicta, congressional testimony, and the like—may influence 
those decisions as to scope. For example, an oft-criticized precedent might 
be interpreted narrowly, thus leaving a wider range for cases of first 
impression (which might, in turn, incorporate practices).  
Even where precedent is plainly on point, judicial practice might 
matter within the traditional stare decisis inquiry. Imagine that the 
Supreme Court is reconsidering the constitutionality of judicial review—
perhaps the paradigmatic legal issue pitting courts against the political 
branches where constitutional text is unclear—214 years after deciding 
Marbury v. Madison.26  We know from courts’ consistent decisions over 
many, many years that they think they can invalidate legislative and 
executive actions as unconstitutional. But we also know that from reading 
Marbury itself.  
If today’s Supreme Court took up the question whether to overrule 
Marbury, the long line of cases exercising judicial review since Marbury 
would be considered through the lens of stare decisis. Certainly, the 
judiciary’s treatment of Marbury in the intervening years would be 
relevant to that analysis. When courts determine whether to reconsider an 
established precedent, they consider a list of factors, including 
whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in 
defying practical workability[,] whether the rule is subject 
to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to 
the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost 
of repudiation[,] whether related principles of law have so 
far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a 
remnant of abandoned doctrine[,] or whether facts have so 
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have 
robbed the old rule of significant application or 
justification.27 
Post-precedent judicial practice—even in the form of public criticism or 
endorsement—might be relevant to at least the first, third, and fourth of 
these factors.  
It should come as no surprise that judicial practices might inform 
courts’ application of stare decisis; the reasons for adherence to precedent 
are similar—in some respects, at least—to the reasons for reliance on 
historical practice. For example, both approaches respect the accumulated 
                                                
26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
27. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–
55 (1992) (citations omitted). 
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wisdom of prior practice28 but permit change in response to “real world” 
necessities. 29  Given these similarities, one might conclude that the 
doctrine of stare decisis absorbs and translates the sort of historical gloss 
analysis courts employ in the absence of precedent. On that view, courts 
are asking a similar question in both contexts but using different language 
to describe their inquiry. 
Though we think the overlap is worthy of attention, it is also important 
to attend to the differences between the analysis demanded by the doctrine 
of stare decisis and the analysis we see in cases like Youngstown or, more 
recently, Noel Canning. To return to our Marbury example, even if 
Marbury had been criticized—in other words, even if the courts’ practice 
had been far from uniform—stare decisis would still place a heavy thumb 
on the scale in favor of precedent. Stare decisis is all about settlement for 
the sake of settlement; it only takes one case to lock in a resolution.30 On a 
gloss analysis, by contrast, courts (and other observers) look for evidence 
of interbranch agreement that emerges over time. A decision by one 
branch might be a move, but it is not the whole game. If an issue is 
eventually settled politically, then good reasons kick in for other actors to 
respect that settlement—and, as we’ve seen, those reasons tend to dovetail 
with the reasons for adherence to precedent. But stare decisis flips the 
burden of persuasion: Once the Supreme Court acts, its move is final 
unless a persuasive case can be made for change.  
C. MORE PRECEDENT, LESS PRACTICE 
When precedent clearly speaks to an issue, it (like other sources of 
binding law) tends to crowd out practice. Precedent takes away the 
discretion—the potential for variation—that otherwise makes consistent 
practice constitutionally meaningful. This point is not limited to the 
Article III context, but applies to gloss-based analysis more generally. 
When the Supreme Court weighs in on a question, the political branches 
have to listen, too, regardless of their prior practices.31 Thus, as other work 
                                                
28. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 2, at 414 (“[A]cquiesced-in government 
practices are sometimes privileged on the theory that they embody wisdom accumulated 
over time and are unlikely to threaten the basic balance of power between Congress and 
the Executive.”). 
29. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (noting the relevance of changing law and fact). 
30. Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are 
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”). 
31. See William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807 (2008) (arguing 
that the President must enforce a judgment regardless of agreement but may ignore a 
judgment if the issuing court lacked jurisdiction); cf. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 2, at 
63 (noting the “inherent tension between the benefits of customary evolution and 
centralized judicial review. Given the authority that federal courts possess in our 
constitutional system today, practice is likely to coordinate around judicial decisions. As 
a result, a judicial decision crediting practice has the potential to freeze the practice in 
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on historical gloss makes clear, historical practices are most significant in 
separation of powers disputes where judicial review is most limited.32   
This helps to explain why gloss-based arguments have been deployed 
most frequently in disputes between the political branches: Such disputes 
are often nonjusticiable. The same will be true of many questions 
concerning the boundaries of the judicial power. 33  If, for example, 
Congress were to pass a law requiring publication of certiorari votes, in 
contravention of longstanding judicial practice,34  it is not immediately 
clear whether anyone would have standing to challenge it.   
Nevertheless, as a relative matter, disputes about the courts’ own 
powers seem more likely to present justiciable controversies than disputes 
about the distribution of authority between the political branches. 
Compared to contests over Articles I and II, controversies about Article III 
appear to be poor candidates for the political question doctrine—at least to 
the extent that application of the doctrine turns on “a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department.”35 And, given that the federal judicial power extends 
only to cases or controversies—disputes that, by definition, already have 
parties—standing is unlikely to pose an obstacle to the adjudication of 
many questions about the specifics of that power. If Congress tried to 
legislate on any of the procedural practices noted above (the size of 
judicial panels, the form of judicial opinions, the tradition of majority 
vote, etc.), the statute could immediately be challenged by parties involved 
in the affected cases. Jurisdiction-stripping statutes would seem to pose a 
serious challenge for judicial review because they take away courts’ power 
to adjudicate certain disputes. Yet, even when they have conceded the loss 
of jurisdiction, courts generally have found ways to weigh in on the 
constitutional questions.36 
To be sure, a precedent-setting decision might well be informed by 
historical practice. With regard to matters of first impression, judges could 
                                                                                                                     
place.”). We bracket here debates about departmentalism. See generally Baude, supra 
note 31, at 1815–16 (explaining departmentalism). 
32. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 2, at 415. 
33. See Grove, supra note 19, at 1836 (“As in other separation of powers arenas, 
many important questions arising under Article III have rarely, if ever, reached the 
judiciary and have instead been addressed by the political branches.”). 
34. Cf. Jeffrey L. Fisher, Opinion, The Supreme Court’s Secret Power, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/opinion/the-supreme-courts-
secret-power.html?_r=0\ [https://perma.cc/Z3CD-NUGK] (arguing that the Court itself 
should do away with the practice). 
35. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). But cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 
224 (1993) (using the political question doctrine to rebuff a challenge to the procedures 
used by the Senate to “try” a judicial impeachment). 
36. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
Deleted: 30
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consider the kinds of practices described above.37 Suppose, for example, 
that Congress passes a law forbidding the publication of dissenting 
opinions by the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals. A court 
considering a challenge to this novel law might purport to do so on the 
basis of constitutional principles regarding judicial independence and 
decisional authority. But it might also invoke longstanding but 
nonprecedential judicial practices with respect to the publication of 
opinions. From that point forward, however, the precedent is what 
governs—the practices no longer have the same independent significance.  
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR ARTICLE III GLOSS GAMES 
We’ve argued that courts are likely to weigh in on questions 
concerning the judicial separation of powers via precedent rather than by 
engaging in the sorts of practices that typically inform arguments about 
historical gloss. What are the implications for gloss analysis in the Article 
III context—in the areas that Bradley and Siegel explore, and others like 
them? 
One takeaway is that, as we expand the frame for gloss analysis to 
include Article III questions, it becomes particularly important to identify 
the relevant players. In Justice Frankfurter’s original formulation, the 
question in Youngstown was whether one political branch had acquiesced 
in a longstanding assertion of authority by the other.38 But acquiescence is 
only meaningful if the proper party is acquiescing. To take an extreme 
example, it would make no sense to say that the courts had “acquiesced” 
in a President’s claim of unilateral authority to make war without 
congressional authorization: The relevant power is not theirs to waive.   
Likewise, to the extent that courts have a legitimate role to play in 
defining the scope of the federal judicial power—a matter on which we 
express no opinion—any “acquiescence” by a political branch should be 
                                                
37. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989) (“‘[T]raditional 
ways of conducting government . . . give meaning’ to the Constitution. Our 200-year 
tradition of extrajudicial service is additional evidence that the doctrine of separated 
powers does not prohibit judicial participation in certain extrajudicial activity.”) 
(omission in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (rejecting the argument that “judges of the supreme court have 
no right to sit as circuit judges” on the ground that “practice and acquiescence under it for 
a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, 
affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction”). 
38. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never 
before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the 
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our 
government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 
1 of Art. II.”). 
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largely irrelevant, or at least not dispositive. The political branches might 
rely on their own historical practices to resolve disputes as between 
themselves, and in that sense they might be involved in a two-branch gloss 
game. But whatever settlement Congress and the President reach cannot 
fully resolve the underlying question if the relevant powers are not theirs 
to waive.  
Thus, while gloss analysis can help solve constitutional puzzles, it also 
creates new puzzles of its own. Identifying the proper parties in gloss 
games will often turn on difficult questions about the Constitution’s 
allocation of authority among the branches. For example, suppose the text 
of the Constitution is unclear as to whether the President or Congress gets 
to control the size of the Court, but that the text is clear that the Court 
itself has no say in the matter. Through that lens, the relevant gloss game 
is the one played between the political branches—power over the Court is 
just the spoils of the war. But if one believes that the Constitution is not 
clear on the matter (or even that past practice makes it unclear),39 then the 
courts themselves might also have a valid role to play in the gloss game.   
A second set of takeaways concerns the possible advantages that stare 
decisis might bestow on courts. Previous scholarship has noted that the 
President has a leg up in gloss games against Congress, given the 
executive branch’s more unitary structure and institutional memory 
(including OLC’s own commitment to internal precedent). 40  So too, 
perhaps, with courts. The judiciary’s hierarchical structure and 
commitment to stare decisis allow it to avoid many of the collective action 
problems that plague multimember institutions and to commit to a 
common course of conduct, even in the face of disagreement and dissent. 
Granted, if the first decision establishing the precedent is power-denying 
rather than power-grabbing, obedience to precedent will work against the 
courts rather than in their favor. But the same is true of the executive. To 
the extent one believes that, all else equal, each branch would prefer to 
expand its power than to contract it,41 then the courts’ commitment to 
precedent should make them particularly powerful players in Article III 
gloss games. 
                                                
39. The existence of long-standing practices might impact the perceived clarity of 
constitutional commands. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed 
Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213 (2015). 
40. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2605 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In 
any controversy between the political branches over a separation-of-powers question, 
staking out a position and defending it over time is far easier for the Executive Branch 
than for the Legislative Branch.”); Bradley & Morrison, supra note 2, at 438–47. 
41. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). For a skeptical view, see generally Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building 
Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005). 
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Notably, moreover, precedent-setting decisions are relatively unlikely 
to cede power because of historical practice. That is, it is difficult (though 
not impossible42) to think of examples in which a case of first impression 
might feature a history of acquiescence by the courts. Suppose that 
Congress makes an aggressive move, like the “no dissenting opinions” 
statute above. And suppose we’re right to think that such a statute could 
immediately be challenged. On the one hand, historical practice would be 
of little help to Congress in that scenario: This is the first such statute. 
(Perhaps practice could be relevant on Congress’s side of the contest if 
many prior bills had been proposed but rejected for unrelated reasons, but 
there would probably be no judicial acquiescence in that scenario.) On the 
other hand, practice could support the courts’ side. We can imagine a 
court’s reasoning: “We have always decided whether or not to publish our 
opinions, and Congress has never before claimed the power to tell us 
otherwise.” It seems possible, then, that gloss games in which courts are 
players will tend to function as a one-way ratchet favoring the courts. 
CONCLUSION 
Professors Bradley and Siegel have shed much-needed light on the 
intersection between historical gloss analysis and the judicial power. In 
this response, we have suggested that the institution of stare decisis may 
limit the purview of gloss analysis in the Article III context—or, at the 
very least, that courts will not “play” gloss games in quite the same way as 
the political branches. These are just a few of the important and difficult 
questions elicited by Bradley and Siegel that will enrich history-based 
federal courts scholarship going forward. 
                                                
42. See Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 307 (invoking “acquiescence” by founding-era 
justices as authoritative). 
